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Abstract 
In continental Europe, banks are more and more replaced by non-bank institutional investors 
in the financing and control of firms. This must not imply a shift to arm’s length finance, if 
these institutional investors develop relationships with firms similar to the traditional long-
term bank-firm relationship. The present paper differentiates between relationship banking 
and  relationship  investing  within  the  theory  of  the  firm  and  compares  the  financial  and 
corporate control services provided by both arrangements.  
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1. Introduction 
The financial landscape in Europe is subject to profound changes, driven by increasing wealth 
and  population  aging,  advances  in  information  technology  and  European  integration. 
Demographic trends and a move towards funded pension systems will boost capital markets 
and enhance the ongoing shift from traditional bank intermediation to intermediation by non-
bank institutional investors, mainly pension funds, mutual funds and life insurance companies 
(Davis 2003). Increasing competition between large publicly held companies for international 
capital  market  funds  and  between  performance  oriented  asset  managers  for  mobilizing 
savings put pressure on management to increase shareholder orientation and improve investor 
relations,  in  particular  by  the  release  of  more  public  information.  Since  the  professional 
institutional investors hold internationally diversified portfolios of investments, whose return 
is  periodically  evaluated  against  international  benchmarks,  their  activities  have  induced  an 
international  standardization  of  investments  policies  and  performance  measurements 
(Moerland  1995).  This  puts  the  control–oriented  financial  systems  with  their  reliance  on 
insider  control,  long-term  implicit  contracts  and  stakeholder  orientation  under  pressure,  in 
particular regarding the role of banks as an effective instrument of control in such systems as 
the German and the Japanese ones (Neuberger, 2000). 
This  development  may  be  seen  as a move from continental European bank-based financial 
systems  towards  the  Anglo-Saxon  market-based  system.  According  to  a  long  and  well 
established literature the contrast between a market-based and a bank-based financial system 
is exemplified by the contrast between short-termism and long-termism (Kaplan 1994). The 
Anglo-Saxon  market-based  system  is  characterized  by  a  huge  number  of  institutional 
investors who have a short-term approach on investment, focusing their attention on annual 
and inter-annual results and on return ratios, and by companies that finance themselves first of 
all  through  the  capital  market,  while  using  bank  loans  mainly  to  finance  day-to-day 
operations. On the contrary, the German and Japanese bank-based model is characterized by a 
small  number  of  sizeable  investors,  mainly  banks  and  insurance  companies,  which  have  a 
long-term investment approach and are less committed with investigating how the managers 
manage the company in the short run.
1 On the one hand they finance directly the companies’ 
long-term investments through long term credits, on the other hand they are often among the 
                                                 
1 See among others Allen/Gale (1995, 2000), Breuer (2001), Albert (1991), Guatri/Vicari (1994). Kaplan (1994) 
argues that empirical findings call into question the view that the relationship oriented systems of Germany and 
Japan are able to ignore current measures of performance.  
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biggest shareholders of the companies they have financed (Wenger/ Kaserer 1998). In this 
sense Carlin and Mayer (2000) argue that economies of scale in monitoring make banks more 
efficient  monitors  than  individual  market  participants,  in  particular  when  good  investments 
require the costly accumulation of available information on the quality and performance of  
borrowers. This is brought about especially in long-term bank-firm relationships. 
Even  if  in  Europe  we  observe  a  movement  from  bank-based  financing  to  market-based 
financing with a growing role of non-bank institutional investors, this is not necessarily a shift 
from relationship finance to arm’s length provision of finance. To the extent that institutional 
investors are active holders of shares and/or debt securities, they develop relationships with 
firms  that  may  have  features  of  the  traditional  bank-firm  relationship  (Perée/Riess  2003, 
p.24).  Whether  this  shift  from  relationship  banking  to  relationship  investing will ultimately 
lead  to  efficiency  gains,  is  an  open question. In Germany, the general public is concerned 
about the dissolution of housebank relationships which are seen as valuable for the financing 
of small and medium-sized enterprises. At the same time, in the U.S. there is concern about 
the  behavior  of  institutional  investors,  mutual  funds  being  accused  of  hurting  investors  by 
pursuing their own goals (The Economist 2003a,b).  
While the benefits and costs of institutional investors’ relationships with firms are primarily 
examined  within  the  corporate  governance  literature  (Davis  2003)  and  the  literature  on 
efficient  markets  (Menkhoff  2002),  the  pros  and  cons  of  relationship  banking  are  mainly 
discussed  within  contract  theory  (Boot  2000,  Ongena/Smith  2000).  The  present  paper 
attempts to integrate both forms of relationship finance within the theory of the firm. We will 
compare  three  alternative  relationships:  (1)  relationship  banking  (or  lending)  as  a  close 
relationship  between  an  industrial  firm  and  a  bank,  resulting  from  long-term  lending  with 
inside information, (2) relationship investing as a close relationship between an industrial firm 
and  a  non-bank institutional investor, where direct control is exerted via large holdings of 
publicly  traded  shares  or  inside  equity;  (3)  transaction  finance  (lending  or  investing)  by 
publicly traded bonds or stocks on the capital market or by arm’s length provision of finance 
by intermediaries.  
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  2  defines  the  different concepts of 
relationship finance and reviews the literature. In section 3 we review the relevant theories of  
the firm and use them to discuss the services provided by both types of relationship finance. 
Section 4 concludes.   4 
2. Concepts of Relationship Finance and Literature Review 
2.1, Transaction Finance, Relationship Finance and Intermediation 
The  provision  of  external  finance  to  firms  may  be  transaction-based  or  relationship-based. 
Transaction finance may be viewed as arm’s length finance which typically involves one-time 
or  short-term  interactions  of  contracting  partners  without  accumulation  of  confidential  or 
private information. Thus, we define transaction finance as the provision of financial services 
by an investor or lender that 
- focuses on a single transaction rather than multiple interactions with the same contracting 
partner; 
- involves only publicly available information. 
Transaction  finance  may  be  provided  directly  by  individual  investors  who  buy  stocks  or 
bonds issued by firms on the capital market. In this case, the investors share directly the risks 
of the projects financed, relying only on public information. Typically, their available funds 
are too small to make costly information gathering in a single firm profitable and at the same 
time  reduce  risk  by  holding  a  diversified  portfolio  of  investments.  Therefore,  individual 
investors gain by delegating fund management and/or monitoring of borrowers to financial 
intermediaries  who  (1)  are  better  informed  and  thus  may  realize  a  superior  investment 
performance, (2) can diversify more broadly because they have larger funds, and (3) can reap 
economies of scale in investment management and/or monitoring of borrowers. In this case, 
direct  finance  is  replaced  by  intermediated  finance,  where  banks  or  non-bank  financial 
intermediaries, so-called institutional investors, collect funds of individual investors to invest 
them  in  productive  firms.  The  terms  “financial  intermediaries”  and  “institutional  investors” 
are  synonymous  terms:  institutional  investors  are  investors  in  financial  markets  which  are 
neither private households nor public institutions (Menkhoff 2002, p. 909). They comprise 
banks  and  non-bank  financial  intermediaries  like  mutual  funds,  pension  funds,  insurance 
companies or venture capital firms.  
While  non-bank  financial  intermediaries  specialize  in  brokerage  services  (like  transaction 
services,  screening,  certification),  banks
2  provide  more  services  of  qualitative  asset 
transformation  (like  monitoring,  liquidity  creation  and  claims  transformation  (see 
                                                 
2 The term “bank” is used for banks that provide commercial banking services. Investment banks, which do not 
provide these services, are considered as non-bank financial intermediaries.  
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Greenbaum/Thakor  1995,  Bhattacharya/Thakor  1993).  Thus,  as  shown  in  figure  1, 
intermediation  by  banks  differs  in  two  important  aspects  from  intermediation  by  non-bank 
institutional investors: 
- On the liability side, banks typically take funds with standard debt contracts, called deposits, 
which  are  not  only  risk-free  (because  of  diversification  and  deposit  insurance),  but  also 
highly  liquid  (because  of  liquidity  insurance).  Non-bank  institutional  investors take funds 
with different risk-sharing contracts (e.g. mutual fund contracts, insurance contracts) and 
provide risk diversification, but not liquidity transformation. 
-  On  the  asset  side,  banks  typically  provide  direct  loans  to  firms  whom  they  screen  and 
monitor, while non-bank institutional investors invest in publicly traded bonds and shares or 
in private equity of the firms which they screen and monitor. 
Both types of intermediated finance also involve transaction finance, if the loans provided by 
banks  and  the  investments  of  non-bank  institutional  investors  are  made  at  arm’s  length, 
without  gathering  of  proprietary  information  by  repeated  transactions  with  the  same 
contracting partner. In the case of (typically) short-term, arm’s length lending by banks we 
speak of transaction lending, in the case of bond holdings and/or share holdings by non-bank 
institutional investors we speak of transaction investing. 
In contrast to transaction finance, we define relationship finance as the provision of financial 
services by an investor or lender that 
- evaluates the profitability of his or her investments through multiple interactions with the 
same customer over time and/or across products;  
- invests in customer-specific, often proprietary information (Boot 2000, p. 10). 
Since such investments are typically made by financial intermediaries and not by individual 
savers, the term relationship finance can be equated with the term relationship intermediation. 
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Figure 1: Intermediated vs. direct financing of firms  
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2.2 Relationship Banking  
The term relationship banking is not sharply defined in the literature.
3 Mostly, it is used to 
describe  lending  relationships  of  (commercial)  banks,  but  it  has  also been used to address 
customer relationships of non-bank financial intermediaries.  
We define relationship banking as  
- the above defined relationship intermediation  
- provided by a bank.  
Since  close  relationships  between  banks  and  their  customers  typically  originate  from  the 
lending  business,  relationship  banking  and relationship lending can be used as synonymous 
terms. In the stricter sense, the term relationship lending only involves close relationships in 
lending,  while  the  term  relationship  banking  encompasses  relationship  lending  and  close 
relationships from other bank services. 
A bank-customer relationship arises when the frequent provision of loans, and usually also of 
other services, leads to benefits that accrue through time to both the bank and the customer. 
Often  the  practitioners’  view  of  a  relationship  is  based  on  concepts  like  “trust”, 
“commitment”, “mutual understanding” and “professionalism”, without pointing out specific 
advantages of such a  relationship relative to alternatives (Ongena/Smith 2000). According to 
the  modern  theory  of  financial  intermediation,  the  benefits  of  relationship  banking  arise 
mainly from a reduction of agency and information problems by unique contractual features 
of implicit, long-term contracts and by the use of information reusability over time. From the 
view  of  the  bank,  the  proximity  to  the  borrower  facilitates  its  monitoring  activity,  thus 
minimizing the moral hazard problem of asymmetric information and providing a source of 
comparative  advantage  versus  de  novo  lenders  and  capital  markets  who  are  less  informed 
about  the borrower (Boot 2000). From the view of the firm, an advantage of relationship 
banking  is  that  the  bank  is  not  likely  to  withdraw  as  soon  as  the  first  problems  occur, 
obtaining  a  kind  of  liquidity  insurance  over  time.  Moreover,  relationship  banking  helps  to 
reduce financing constraints due to asymmetric information. Monitored firms can finance new 
projects with less informative constraints, while unmonitored firms, which cannot defend the 
viability  of  each  project to individual investors, must time investments to their liquidity or 
internally generated funds, or to the wealth of the entrepreneur (Frohlin 1998). These benefits 
                                                 
3 For reviews see Boot (2000), Ongena/Smith (2000).   8 
mainly accrue to small and medium-sized enterprises, which are informationally more opaque 
than large, publicly listed firms. 
Beyond lending, relationship banking includes various other financial services, e.g. deposits, 
check, clearing and cash management services. They represent both a source of revenue and 
information  for  the  banks  (Boot  2000),  and  may  help  to  evaluate  better  the  riskiness  of 
lending  to  a  firm.  The  inside  information  accumulated  by  the  bank  in  the  course  of  a 
relationship  represents  “specific  knowledge”,  i.e.  knowledge  that  is  transmitted  between 
agents only at high cost
4 (Jensen/Smith 1985).  
Let us review the benefits and costs related to information exchange. A borrower might reveal 
proprietary information to its bank that it would never have disclosed to the financial markets 
and  at  the  same  time  could  be  “forced”  to  unveil  some  information,  and  to  be  closely 
monitored by the bank
5. Because of long-term efficiency gains, the effects of bank affiliations 
may  be  more  pronounced  with  time:  for  example  attached  firms’  investment  sensitivity  to 
liquidity  should  be  lower  in  the  longer  run,  even  if  the  evidence  about  this  point  is  not 
unanimous (Frohlin 1998). At the same time the costs associated with the search for the most 
convenient bank in the retail fields are high and the expected return of search is low for most 
of the retail banking customers. As a consequence the demand for most of the standard retail 
banking services is likely to be characterized by “bank loyalty”, i.e. the tendency to maintain 
a banking relationship after having chosen a bank (Neuberger 1998). As a matter of fact in 
order for the client to obtain a competitive offer from another bank, the de novo bank must be 
provided with references and other pertinent information, involving costs to the applicant and 
the  bank,  while  the  applicant  cannot  be  sure  that  the  savings  associated  with  the  new 
conditions  can  overcome  the  search  costs.  This  is  due  both  to  the  firm’s  difficulty  in 
conveying  information  about  its  superior  performance  to  other  banks  and  to  an  adverse 
selection issue, that makes it difficult for one bank to attract another bank’s best customers 
without attracting first the less desirable ones (Sharpe 1990). At least three costs are borne by 
banks  when  entering  into  and  executing  any  debt  contract  with  the  firm:  agency  costs, 
deriving from ex ante information asymmetries, monitoring costs, linked to the control of the 
                                                 
4 Without considering monetary costs it is sufficient to recall the opportunity costs of time spent by bankers in 
order to evaluate the project, visit the firm, keeping in touch with the entrepreneur, screening the balance sheets 
and so on. 
5 Hoshi/Kashyap/Scharfstein (1993). According to Stiglitz (1985) the nature of loan contracts enables the banks 
to focus their attention in information gathering about a particular set of issues, those associated with the 
probability of default and the net worth of the firm.  
  9
correspondence between the contract’s clauses and the development of the financed project; 
and enforcement costs, deriving from ex post information asymmetries (Ferri/Messori 2000).  
In universal banking systems, bank-customer relationships encompass commercial banking. A 
common source of costly information is the placement of bank directors on the firms’ board 
of directors, as best exemplified by the German stylized tradition of having bankers on the 
boards of non-financial companies (Frohlin 1998). Even if Baums (1994) argues that seats on 
the supervisory boards don’t seem to provide always better information than a large creditor 
has,  the  “information  gathering  activity”  of  the  single  board  member  and  the  information 
access of large creditors rest on various specific features and cannot be generalized. Having 
one  or  more  of  its  managers  on  a  client  firm’s  board  is  likely  to  provide  the  financial 
institution access to proprietary information as well as some influence over the firm’s actions 
(Booth/Deli 1999). The presence of bankers on boards has been considered also as a “credible 
message” of a close firm-bank relationship (Schäfer 2003). 
6. A banker may also be appointed 
on the board in order to signal to other banks that an expert in bank debt is on the board to 
protect creditors, a role that could be performed both by affiliated and unaffiliated bankers 
(Booth/Deli 1999). As a matter of fact it is quite difficult to distinguish between commercial 
bankers  supplying  expertise  and  commercial  bankers  monitoring  lending  relationships. 
Berglöf and Sjögren (1998) investigated the case of a bank providing loans to a borrower 
while  an  investment  company,  controlled  by  the  bank
7,  holds  a  relevant  block  in  the 
borrowing company.  
Some authors (Albert, 1991; Guatri/Vicari 1994, Albach 1997) underline another by-product 
of relationship banking, the stability in the control of the firm and a reduction of the myopia 
of some institutional investors, for example through a higher dividend retention and a lower 
interest  in  the  annual  and  infra-annual  pay  out  ratio,  thus  providing  evidence  for  a  strict 
preference for the “pecking order of financing” . 
                                                 
6 The message is credible, because on the one hand the bank risks its own funds, and on the other hand the bank 
risks its “standing”, i.e. its external image within the financial community. 
7 In particular they use the term “related ownership” in order to refer to holdings owned within a sphere of 
influence.   10 
2.3 Relationship Investing 
We define relationship investing as  
- the above defined relationship intermediation 
- provided by a non-bank institutional investor. 
The term “relationship investing” has been used to describe the shareholder activism of non-
bank  institutional  investors  in  the  control  of  publicly  traded companies (Chidambaran/John 
1998,  Gillan/Starks  2000).  Even  if  they  mostly  invest  in  publicly  traded  securities, 
institutional  investors  may  obtain  firm-specific,  private  information  by  multiple  interactions 
with the same corporate customer over time. Such relationships are likely to arise, if large 
share  blocks  are  held  in  a  single  corporation:  they  increase  the  incentive  to  invest  in 
information  gathering  and  monitoring  through  control  rights  and  may  provide  special 
information rights by a representation on the firm’s board.
8 
While  this  only  applies  to  the  financing  of  large  corporations,  the  term  “relationship 
investing” may also be used to describe the activities of non-bank institutional investors such 
as investment banks or venture capital firms in providing inside or private equity to smaller, 
non-listed  firms.  The  partnership  between  a  venture  capitalist  and  an  entrepreneur  is 
characterized by the accumulation of firm-specific, proprietary information during the start-up 
and  growth  phase  of  the  firm,  where  the  venture  capitalist  provides  screening  and 
certification, funding, monitoring and management expertise. A venture capital contract has 
the  following  features:  the  entrepreneur  cannot  “walk  away”  after  obtaining  financing,  the 
venture capitalist gains control of the firm after buying out the entrepreneur if a minimum 
performance  requirement  is  not  met,  and  both  partners  receive  equity  payoffs,  if  control 
remains with the entrepreneur (Greenbaum/Thakor1995, pp.68).
 9  
Thus, equity contracts are the key financial instrument of relationship investing. Even if both 
equity and debt contracts may be written by banks as well as non-bank institutional investors, 
we focus on debt contracts in the case of relationship banking and on equity contracts in the 
                                                 
8 However, the value of large share blocks may not only be maximized by a tighter control over managers, but 
also by extracting transfers from small shareholders, a process generally addressed within the frame of  “private 
benefits of control”(La Porta et al. 1999). 
9  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  role  performed  by  German  housebanks  at  the  end  of  the  19th  century  could  be 
considered as a first kind of venture capitalism, thus representing an ideal link between relationship banking 
and relationship investing. Already at the beginning of 20th century Riesser (1905) provides wide evidence 
about the role of German banks in financing railways and iron industry, that could be considered the start-up 
industries of that time.   
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case of relationship investing. While bank loans, but not investments in equity are necessary 
for  relationship  banking,  investments  in  equity,  but  not  bonds  are  necessary  for  closer 
relationships between non-bank institutional investors and firms.  
Non-bank institutional investors have become increasingly important as equity holders both in 
the American and European financial markets. The equity ownership of investment trusts and 
advisors  and  pension  funds  increased  dramatically  during the last years, and enjoys a high 
level of internationalization, both on the management side (the asset management companies) 
and on the investment side (where the investors invest). In particular some public pensions 
funds  began  to  abandon  their  traditional  passive  shareholder  role  and  became  more  active 
participants  in  the  governance  of  their  corporate  holdings  (Gillan/Starks  2000,  Woidtke 
2002). 
Institutional investors that hold publicly traded shares use different mechanisms of corporate 
control: they may exercise their pressure on firms both by selling shares in underperforming 
firms or in firms that don’t follow international recognized corporate governance standards 
(“Wall Street Walk”) and by exercising direct control over the incumbent management of the 
respective firms (“voice”) (Drobetsz/Shillhofer/Zimmermann 2003). Qualified investors often 
negotiate directly with the managers and submit shareholder proposals only if the negotiations 
don’t have any relevant effect (Gillan/Starks 2000). When shares are held for a longer time 
institutions will become aware of the use and consequences of discretionary accounting, thus 
reducing incentives for the earning management (Chung/Firth/Kim 2002). 
Institutional investors are willing to pay significant premiums for well governed companies, 
or  significant  discounts  for  bad  governed  ones  (McKinsey&Co.  2000).  The  body  of  the 
research has focused on the virtues of institutional investors in forcing management to focus 
on  economic  performance  and  eschewing  opportunistic self-serving behavior, even if some 
research underlined the myopia of those who focus on the short-term performance of the firm 
to  the  detriment  of  its  longer-term  prosperity  (Chung/Firth/Kim  2002)
10.  The  primary 
emphasis of activist shareholders has been to focus on the poorly performing firms in their 
portfolio  and  to  pressure  the  management  of  such  firms  for  improved  performance,  thus 
enhancing shareholder value (Gillan/Starks 2000). Moerland (1995) argues that the excessive 
functioning of the market for corporate control with practices such as corporate raiding, crude 
hostile takeovers or junk bonds, has lost importance having been partially replaced by active 
                                                 
10 For an overview on the empirical evidence see Menkhoff (2002).   12 
investors’  diplomacy  and  persuasion  as  disciplining  mechanisms.  This  could  represent  a 
turnover  in  respect  of  the  role  traditionally  addressed  to  hostile  takeovers  (  Manne  1965, 
Jensen 1986). 
The different types of institutional investors differ with respect to their monitoring incentives 
and  capabilities.  Pound  (1988)  notes  that  institutional  investors  such  as  banks  should  be 
effective monitors because they have frequent business contact to their clients, even if they 
might  become  entrenched  and  support  incumbent  managers.  For  example,  business 
relationships between banks and management are likely to be associated with voting behavior 
that is conductive to continuance of the relationships, thus being supportive of management 
proposals,  as  are  banks  sharing  one  or  more  directors  with  the  firm.  Director  interlocks 
between  banks  and  firms  are  related  to  the  outcome  of  the  vote,  with  affiliated  banks 
supporting management proposals, and unaffiliated ones opposing them (Payne/Millar/Glezen 
1996). According to these conflicts of interests, investment or pension funds could be better 
monitors than banks or insurers, even if they also face some of these conflicts (Charny 1995).  
Empirical  evidence  shows  that  the  results  of  negotiations  and  shareholder  proposals  are 
associated with the sponsor identity, which seems to sort out a leading effect, with a “leader” 
making the first step, and the other investors following the leader approach: this is generally 
recognized  in  the  role  of  some  prominent  institutions,  as  for  example  the  American 
CALPERS.  Moreover  the  identity  of  the  sponsor  could  be  analyzed  distinguishing  two 
different groups, i.e. big individual investors and institutional investors. Proposals sponsored 
by the first group generally garner fewer votes, while the impact of the second group enjoys 
the above described lead effect (Gillan/Starks 2000). 
3. Relationship Finance within the Theory of the Firm 
3.1 Theories of the Firm Relevant for Relationship Finance 
To work out the services provided by the different sorts of financial relationships, we resort to 
different theories of the firm. Broadly, we may differentiate between the neoclassical and the 
contractual theories of the firm. In the neoclassical economic school, a firm is just described 
by  efficient  relationships  between  inputs  and  outputs,  using  the  concept  of  a  production 
function. Even if this black-box concept cannot explain the functions of intermediaries, we 
will  use  it  to  describe  which  inputs  to  firm production are provided by different forms of 
external finance.  
  13
The contractual theories of the firm, which have been developed along with the theory of 
incomplete  markets  since  the  1970s,  yield  explanations  both  for  the  existence  of  financial 
intermediaries and their contractual relationships with firms. Despite their heterogeneity, they 
have  the  common  focus  of  explaining  firms  as  organizations  under  two  aspects:  first,  the 
substitution of short-term contracts on the product markets by long-term contracts between 
input owners, and second, the substitution of market mechanisms by hierarchy.
11 They may be 
broadly divided into two groups: principal-agency theory and transaction-cost theory. 
The principal-agent theory deals with bilateral contractual relationships between two partners, 
the principal and the agent, which are affected by problems of asymmetric information, i.e. 
the principal cannot directly observe the activities of the agent or the agent has more relevant 
information than the principal..
12 The focus is on designing an optimal contract which will 
motivate the agent to share his private information so that the action expected by the principal 
will  be  effectively  realized.  The  classical  agency-theory  problem  was  posed  by  Berle  and 
Means  in  1932  for  the  public  company  with  dispersed  shareholders,  where  the  separation 
between  owners  (principals)  and  managers  (agents)  causes  agency  costs  by  suboptimal 
control of the management. Within this theory, firms have been considered as “…simply legal 
fictions  which  serve  as  a  nexus  for  a  set  of  contracting  relationships  among  individuals“ 
(Jensen/Meckling 1976, p.325). It has been applied both to explain financial intermediation as 
an optimal nexus of contracts and the problems of optimal corporate control. 
Beyond the ‘nexus of contracts view’ (Alchian/Demsetz 1972, Jensen/Meckling 1976, Fama 
1980), another view is that firms are characterized by more than the legal status, since they 
provide a solution to moral hazard in teams (Alchian/Demsetz 1972, Holmström 1982). This 
view emphasizes the technology of team production, where marginal products are costly to 
measure, and shows the circumstances under which it may be optimal to appoint a monitor 
who has the rights to the residual income of the team. Another view of team production has 
been provided by Aoki (1986, 1988) and Marschak/Radner (1972), who consider a firm as a 
group of input owners with a common goal. According to this view, team production does not 
serve  to  prevent  opportunism,  but    to  gather  and  share  information  under  uncertainty.  It 
emphasizes  “…the  image  of  a    firm  which  must  develop  its  resources  by  learning  new 
                                                 
11For overviews see Cheung (1983), Foss/Lando/Thomsen (2000), Krafft/Ravix (1998), Richter/Furubotn (1997)  
12See Jensen/Meckling (1976), Alchian/Demsetz (1972), Fama (1980), Holmström (1982).   14 
informational relations before being able to use them” (Krafft/Ravix 1998, p. 248).
13 Since 
incomplete information is the central problem of external finance, we will use also this theory 
to study the functions of financial relationships. 
The transaction-cost theory is based on the question posed by Ronald Coase in 1937: when do 
firms produce to their own need (backward, forward or lateral integration) and when do they 
procure in the market? It explains the use of markets for some transactions and the use of 
hierarchical forms of organization for others by transaction-cost differences between markets 
and hierarchies (Williamson 1988, p. 568). In contrast to the principal-agent theory, the focus 
is not on the ex ante incentive alignment of contracts under asymmetric information, but on 
the  ex  post  governance  of  incomplete  contracts.  Since  not  all  contingencies  can  be 
contractually covered, contracts are incomplete, and there is a need of adaptation to changing 
circumstances.  This  applies  above  all  to  long-term  contracts  such  as  the  long-term  loan 
contracts  between  banks  and  firms.  Like  long-term  labor  contracts,  they  are  likely  to  be 
implicit.
14 An implicit contract describes complex agreements, written and tacit, which govern 
the exchange of services when various types of specific investments inhibit the mobility of 
production  inputs,  and  opportunities  to  shed  risks  are  limited  by  imperfect  markets  for 
contingent  claims  (Azariadis  1990,  p.  132).  It  results  from  bargaining  of  the  contractual 
partners over sharing the returns of their relationship-specific investments in various possible 
future  circumstances  (Azariadis  1990,  p.  138).  By  forming  such  relational  contracts,  the 
parties generally commit to some common goal rather than to a specific course of conduct 
(Boatright 2002). 
Within  the  transaction-cost  theory,  the  property  rights  theory  of  the  firm  focuses  on  the 
allocation of ownership as the possession of residual control rights, i.e. rights to control the 
uses of assets under contingencies that are not specified in the contract. It considers a firm as 
a collection of jointly-owned assets (Grossman/Hart 1986, Hart/Moore 1990, Hart 1995) and 
is  relevant  for  the  question  of  optimal  corporate  control.  The  second  major  branch  of 
transaction-cost theory is the governance structure approach of Williamson (e.g. 1975, 1979, 
1985, 1988). Its basic idea is to assign transactions to alternative governance structures on the 
                                                 
13This team theory has been considered as an extension instead of an alternative to the principal-agent theory, 
since the agents are still optimizing, making their decisions on the basis of imperfect information, where the 
variables designating the optimum form of organization are all known (Krafft/Ravix 1998, p. 251). 
14According to Frank Knight (1921), labor contracts are implicit in the sense “…that inherently ’confident and 
venturesome’ entrepreneurs will offer to relieve their employees of some market risks in return for the right to 
make allocative decisions” (Azariadis 1990, p. 133).  
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basis of their transaction properties, which are determined above all by the degree of asset 
specificity. In long-term financial relationships, asset specificity results from the acquisition 
of private information. 
Figure  2  illustrates  the  relevance  of  the  different  contractual  theories  of  the  firm  for  the 
explanation of financial contracts, intermediaries and relationships, which we will review in 
more detail below. After a view on the neoclassical production function (3.2), we will discuss 
financial  intermediation  as  a  nexus  of  contracts  (3.3),  relationship  intermediation  as  team 
production (3.4), corporate control rights of financiers (3.5) and the governance of incomplete 
financial contracts (3.6). The results are summarized in table 1. 
Contractual Theories of the Firm
Principal Agent Theory:
Optimal Contracts under Asymmetric
Information
Transaction Cost Theory:























Contractual Theories of the Firm
Principal Agent Theory:
Optimal Contracts under Asymmetric
Information
Transaction Cost Theory:
























Figure 2:  Explanation of financial contracts and intermedianies by contractual 
theories of the firm   16 
Table 1: Comparison of Different Financing Relationships  
Provision of  Services  Relationship Banking  Relationship Investing  Transaction Finance 
Inputs to Firm 
Production:  
q = f(risk, information) 
insolvency risk,  
inside information 
residual claim risk,  
inside information 
insolvency risk or 
residual claim risk, 
outside information 
Nexus of contracts by 
delegation  
banks as delegated 
monitors:  
- economies of scale in 
contracting and 
monitoring  
- liquidity creation with 
disciplinary mechanism 
of runs 
- agency costs between 
bank and depositors 
non-bank institutional 
investors as delegated 
monitors: 
- economies of scale in 
contracting and 
monitoring  
- agency costs between 
institutional investor and 
fund owners 
direct contracts, no 
delegation  
 
Team Production   cooperation between  
bank and borrower:  
- information  
- risk sharing  
cooperation between 
venture capitalist and 
firm:  
- information  
- risk sharing 
no cooperation  
Corporate control    reduction of agency costs 
of debt and equity 
reduction of agency costs 
of equity 
high agency costs of 
external finance  
Governance of 
incomplete contracts 
implicit loan contracts 
with state-dependent 
claims: 
- intertemporal contract 
design  
- renegotiability: 






- hold-up  
- soft budget constraint 









- long-run profit 
maximization 
problems: 
- hold-up  
- soft budget constraint 
explicit contracts with 
state-independent or 




3.2 Financial Contracts and the Production Function of a Firm  
The  usual  neoclassical  production  function  relates  firm  output  to  capital  and  labor  inputs, 
which  are  financed  by  the  firm’s  revenues.  In  this  case  of  internal  finance,  contracts  with 
external financiers are irrelevant. However, if the scarcity of internal funds limits production, 
external  finance  is  a  further  production  factor  with  positive  marginal  returns.  Financial 
contracts with external financiers differ with respect to two fundamental inputs which they 
provide: bearing of risk and information. Therefore, we consider the more general production 
function  
q = f(risk, information),  
with q as output and f as the neoclassical production function. 
Given that individuals are risk-averse, risk can be considered as a scarce production factor 
with a positive marginal productivity (Sinn 1986). Along this line of reasoning the production 
function coincides with the efficiency line of the capital asset pricing model. The supply of 
the factor risk can be increased by different risk-bearing institutions or organizations such as 
insurance and stock markets, financial intermediaries, but also special financing relationships. 
It depends on the type of the contract: in a standard debt contract, the lender has a constant 
interest and capital claim and bears the risk that the borrower cannot repay. In the case of 
insolvency, the whole property rights on the firm are transferred to the lender. In an equity 
contract, on the other hand, the equity owner has a state-dependent claim on the residual in 
solvent states, bearing the residual claim risk. 
As a second production factor we consider information as the knowledge or competence of 
the financier to allocate the funds to their best possible use. We presume that a financier is 
better informed if he has gathered not only publicly available information but also inside or 
private information about the state and the prospects of the firm. The higher this stock of 
information, the lower is the information asymmetry between the firm and its financier and 
the  lower  are  the  concomitant  agency  costs  of  external  finance.  Like  a  technical  or  an 
organizational progress, an increase in information may be described by an outward shift of 
the production function rather than a move along its frontier. 
From a macroeconomic perspective, the above production function may be used to describe 
the contributions of a whole financial system to an economy’s production capacity. According 
to Hellwig (2000), following the way paved by Jensen (1986), the main problem of a financial 
system  is  not  the  scarcity  of  funds,  but  rather  the  misallocation of funds, e.g. by retained   18 
earnings,  hidden  reserves,  disposal  of  assets  or  opportunistic  behavior  of  managers  in  the 
presence of asymmetric information. In such an economy the task of the financial system is 
not only to channel the funds from households to firms, but also to channel the funds within 
the corporate system, from firms with excessive cash flow to firms with insufficient funds or 
from  X-inefficient  firms  to  more  efficient  ones.  The  allocative  competence  of  a  financial 
system thus depends on its ability to reduce information asymmetries and provide possibilities 
of risk sharing and information sharing.  
Given the above definitions of relationship banking and relationship investing, both kinds of 
relationship finance are superior to transaction finance in providing inside information, while 
they  differ  with  respect  to  the  provision  of  risk  bearing.  Being  based  on  debt  financing, 
relationship  banking  bears  above  all  insolvency  risk,  while  the  equity-based  relationship 
investing bears above all residual claim risk. 
3.3 Financial Intermediation as a Nexus of Contracts  
Within  the  agency-theoretic  nexus  of  contracts  view,  firms  come  into  existence  as 
intermediaries that reduce the number of direct market contracts between individuals and the 
associated  contracting  and  monitoring  costs.  Likewise,  the  existence  of  financial 
intermediaries, and their special relationships with contracting partners, can be explained by 
their functions of delegated contracting and monitoring on behalf of individual investors. If 
they  have  gathered  specific  information  about  borrowers  or  investment  projects,  the 
reusability  of  this  information  can  be  used  to  reap  economies  of  scale  in  long-run 
relationships.  
The new theory of financial intermediation (developed since Diamond 1984, Caloromis/Kahn 
1991,  Allen  1990)  shows  that  banks  are  financial  intermediaries  which  can  solve  specific 
information and incentive problems in the relationships with savers and investors better than 
this could be done by non-bank financial intermediaries or direct financing. Within the theory 
of asymmetric information, Diamond (1984) shows that a special role of banks is to minimize 
the agency costs between borrowers and lenders by monitoring the borrowers at low cost, 
while  Diamond  and  Dybvig  (1983)  find  another  special  function  of  banks  in  their  role  of 
transforming  illiquid  assets  into  liquid  liabilities,  providing  insurance  against  liquidity  risk 
with private information to agents.  
Diamond and Rajan (2001) show that relationship lending is the best way to create efficient 
monitoring  and  maximum  liquidity  simultaneously.  Real  assets  or  projects  are  illiquid,  
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because the entrepreneur can always threaten to withhold his specific skills in the future and 
thus capture a rent. A relationship lender who has gained knowledge about the project has a 
better liquidation threat than any other financier and thus can extract a larger fraction of the 
cash  flows  generated.  When  the  relationship  lender  is  a  bank,  issuing  demand  deposits,  it 
cannot hold up depositors by not paying them the promised amount. Demand deposits are 
fixed claims with a sequential service constraint, where the depositors get their money back 
until the bank runs out of money. Any attempt by the bank to extort a rent from depositors by 
threatening to withdraw her specific abilities would cause a run, where the depositors demand 
back  their  money  simultaneously  without  renegotiating.  Hence,  the  fragility  of  the  bank’s 
deposits ensures that the bank provides the maximum amount of credit it can offer.
15  
Non-bank institutional investors, in contrast, do not create liquidity and hence do not have this 
disciplinary  mechanism  of  runs.  A  depositor  of  a  mutual  fund  has  the  right  to  seize  that 
proportion of assets that equals his proportion of total deposits. Thus, the holdings are marked 
to  market  and  the  mutual  fund  is  run-proof.  If  mutual  funds  are  actively  engaged  in 
monitoring, providing relationship investing, depositors are not able to discipline them and 
the  managers  may  capture  rents.  This  applies  also  to  insurance  firms  that  unlike  banks, 
provide payments only when liquidity needs are observable and verifiable.
16 Also investment 
banks or venture capitalists differ from commercial banks in this respect: because their value 
lies largely in future transactions, they cannot be efficiently cut out of the deal, hence demand 
deposits are unlikely to provide discipline (Diamond/Rajan 2001, pp. 317). 
A problem with both relationship banking and relationship investing is that the delegation of 
monitoring to an intermediary involves by itself agency costs, so-called delegation costs. In 
the case of relationship banking, they arise from the asymmetric information between bank 
managers and bank depositors/shareholders, while in the case of relationship investing, they 
arise  from  the  asymmetric  information  between  institutional  investors  and  their  funds’ 
beneficial owners. According to Diamond (1984), the delegation costs for bank depositors go 
to zero, if the bank is large enough to diversify its loan portfolio so that the depositors are 
                                                 
15In a world of uncertainty, it is optimal for the bank to finance itself not only by deposits, but also by outside 
capital, which is a softer claim that can be renegotiated in bad times (Diamond/Rajan 2000). 
16Only life insurance companies may have partly demandable claims that allow withdrawal of a fixed amount 
even if the insurable event does not occur, making them prone to runs.   20 
shielded from credit risk.
17 This results from the debt contracts of banks, so that a similar 
conclusion cannot be drawn for the equity contracts of (non-bank) institutional investors.  
While the theory of financial intermediation is unanimous about optimal debt contacts, it is 
indeterminate  about  the  effects  of  delegated  monitoring  in  the  case  of  sub-optimal  equity 
contracts (Schneider 2000, p. 215). Institutional owners function as principals to corporate 
managements  and  as  agents  for  their  beneficial  owners  or,  in  their  intermediary  role  of 
monitoring  for  beneficial  owners,  as  ‘agents  monitoring  other  agents’.  Within  this  ‘nexus 
agency model’ it has been argued that institutional investors are complex organizations which 
pursue  their  own  goals  and  the  goals  of  their  stakeholders  apart  from  those  of  beneficial 
owners  (Schneider  2000).  Additional  agency  costs  result  from  detrimental  incentives  that 
divert  the  behavior  away  from  maximizing  investment  performance:  especially  the 
requirement to conform with short-term evaluations leads to short-term orientation, distorted 
risk consideration and useless activities (Menkhoff 2002). Whether these additional agency 
costs outweigh the cost reductions brought about by intermediation (portfolio diversification, 
better  corporate  monitoring)  cannot  be  answered  a  priori,  because  it  depends  on  the 
effectiveness  of  the  legal  and  regulatory  environment  and  the  governance  mechanisms  in 
protecting the interests of the beneficial owners. Empirical studies that concentrate on non-
bank  institutional  investors  that  invest  in  US  stock  portfolios  show  that  their  investment 
performance  is  usually  below  the  market  benchmark.  While  they  realize  advantages  of 
diversification,  they  fail  to  realize  information  advantages.  The  benefits  of  improved 
corporate  governance  go  along  with  costs  of  generating  short-term  strategies,  increased 
volatility  and  less  sensitivity  toward  social  issues  in  the  managed  companies.  The  agency 
costs depend on the type of institutional investor, e.g. pension funds having higher agency 
costs than mutual funds (Menkhoff 2002, 2001, Schneider 2000). 
3.4 Relationship Intermediation as Team Production 
As argued by Alchian and Woodward (1987, p. 118), “…long-term, or what the law calls 
relational,  contracts  are  essential  to  continuity  of  teamwork  with  dependent  resources”. 
Moreover, “Teamwork seldom appears without a nexus of contracts, and a nexus of contracts 
                                                 
17In Diamond’s model of financial intermediation, banks are all deposit funded. In reality, bank deposits are not 
risk-free and the remaining risk is borne by the bank’s shareholders (and a deposit insurance fund). However, 
the  shareholders  only  have  the  incentive  to  monitor  the  bank  managers,  if  they  hold large blocks in the 
respective bank. At least in Germany, where the big stock banks are mostly held in dispersed ownership, this 
does not seem to be the case. It is an open question whether this monitoring problem may be solved by (bank or 
non-bank) institutional investors.  
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seldom  appears  in  the  absence  of  teamwork  ”  (Alchian/Woodward,  1987,  p.111).  Hence, 
long-term contracts of  financial intermediaries should involve elements of team production. 
According to Aoki, the capability of the firm of having positive economic returns rests on 
“the willingness of the employees to cooperate and the ability of the employer to adapt and 
monitor production effectively under uncertainty” (Aoki 1984, p.30). A cooperative team or 
organization could be considered a system for allocating the resources better than a sequel of 
unique transactions, above all due to the saving of risk cost, the reduction of shirking and the 
enhancement  of  informational  efficiency  in  regulating  the  formation  and  utilization  of  the 
team  element  of  human  resources  (Aoki  1984,  p.  30).  Cooperation  in  production  is  a 
cooperation  between  suppliers  of  inputs  (Alchian  1993,  p.  367).  Applied  to  relationship 
banking, we may consider it as a cooperation within a team constituted by the bank and the 
firm in supplying risky capital and information. Within such a team, the borrowing firm must 
be willing to provide information about investment opportunities and risks to the bank, which 
in turn provides capital and risk bearing to the firm. According to Alchian and Woodword 
(1987), teams arise where information is costly: gathering information about the borrower is 
likely to be a very resource expensive process, and relationship banking rests on information 
cost savings.  
The  informational  efficiency  of utilizing special human resources in lending relationships is 
not  only  brought  about  by  the  bank’s  inside  information,  but  also  by  social  interactions 
between loan officers and firm managers which may create mutual understanding and trust. 
Empirical studies on relationship lending in Germany show that such social interactions do 
indeed  lead  to  more  favorable  lending  terms  for  small  and  medium-sized  firms 
(Harhoff/Körting  1998,  Lehmann/Neuberger  2001).  Differences  in  this  sort  of  team 
production brought about by different histories or development levels might explain why we 
observe  lending  gaps  between  different  regions  of  the  same  country  (Ferri/Messori  2000, 
Lehmann/Neuberger/Räthke 2004). 
Critics of this view of relationship lending as a cooperative team argue that banks can exploit 
influenced firms, being able to earn profits in excess of the competitive level. According to 
the  team  theory,  external  agents  are  necessary  to  induce  efficient  equilibrium  in  team 
production settings. However, while external agents may be necessary, they cannot sustain an 
efficient outcome if the internal members of the team don’t have some assurance that their 
product will not be expropriated (Falaschetti 2002). According to Köke (2001), ownership 
concentration  and  bank  debt,  as  well  as  market  discipline  reflected  by  product  market   22 
competition,  are  positively  related  to  productivity  growth.  However,  creditor  influence 
depends on a strong position measured as a large fraction of bank debt. Thus, the reduction of 
bank lending, for example through increasing securitization or issue of corporate bonds, could 
negatively affect the banks’ incentives or ability to monitor (Köke 2001).  
Also  relationship  investing  can  involve  a  kind  of  team  production,  considering  the 
cooperation between firms and institutional investors to share information and equity risks. 
This applies above all to the relationships of firms with venture capitalists, but less to those 
with institutional investors that invest only in publicly traded shares and are less likely to have 
long-term,  social  interactions  with  firm  managers.  As  already  mentioned  above,  these 
institutional investors do not seem to reap efficiency gains by information advantages. 
3.5 Corporate Control Rights of Financiers  
According  to  Berle  and  Means  (1932)  conflicts  of  interest  arise  between  managers  and 
residual claimants when risk bearing is separated from management of the firm. Here we face 
the problem that the monitoring activity has the nature of a public good. Every shareholder is 
aware of the fact that it is too expensive for him to exercise an effective monitoring activity 
on the management, and that at the same time all the other shareholders would take advantage 
of  his  efforts,  giving  rise  to  a  free  riding  process  (Stiglitz,  1985). In the public company, 
characterized by the so-called absent property (Galbraith 1958), the residual claimants try to 
solve  the  problem  by  delegating  the  management  of  the  firm  to  a  group  of  people  who 
professionally do it, the managers, while their relationship is regulated by a contract, that just 
gives some guidelines to the directors (Berle/Means, 1932). The result of this contract is that 
the corporation is managed through an agency relationship between the shareholders on the 
one  side  and  the  managers  on  the  other,  going  along  with  agency  costs.
18  The  so-called 
consumption  of  agency  goods  by  managers  may  include  not  only  the  consumption  of 
perquisite,  but  also  avoiding  effort,  avoiding  risk,  building  empires,  establishing  golden 
parachutes,  subsidizing  their  favorite  activities,  discriminating  in  lay  off  and  implementing 
strategies  to  increase  the  managers’  control  and  to  reduce  the  probability  of  takeovers. 
Managers’ consumption of agency goods reduces the firms’ financial performance and can be 
undertaken only to the extent that the managers are able to resist principals’ disciplining 
                                                 
18Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the sum of the costs of structuring, administering and 
enforcing contracts, plus the residual loss. Agency costs include all costs frequently referred as contracting 
costs, transaction costs, moral hazard costs and information costs (Jensen/Smith 1985).   
  23
The reduction of agency costs by different control rights of the external financiers are the 
main objects of corporate governance studies
19. The role of banks and non-bank institutional 
shareholders’  activism  arises  due  to  the  conflict  of  interests  between  managers  and 
shareholders, and to the free rider problems connected with the lack of incentives for small 
investors in monitoring. Investors with large blocks appear to be the only ones which have the 
incentives  to  undertake  such  monitoring  activities,  as  it  is  more  likely  that  the  large 
shareholders’  increased  return  from  monitoring  is  sufficient  to  cover  the  associated 
monitoring costs (Gillan/Starks 2000). 
When a firm is financed partially with debt moral hazard arises, because the equity holders 
don’t  bear  the  full  consequence  of  negative  outcomes,  while  enjoying  the  full  positive 
consequences  of  their  decisions.  The  main  sources  of  conflicts  are  a  redistribution  from 
bondholders  to  stockholders  that  would  arise  from  an  increase  in  dividend  payout,  higher 
leverage,  substitution  of  high-risk  for  low  risk  projects  (asset  substitution),  and 
underinvestment in projects that would yield a higher benefit to bondholders (Jensen/Smith 
1985).  This  bondholder  vs  stockholder  conflict  would  not  be  solved  simply  by  giving  the 
bondholders  control  over  the  firm:  bondholders  would  have  incentives  to  pay  too  few 
dividends, issue too little debt, and choose projects with too little risk. Within the theoretical 
frame of state-dependent control, the control over the firm should be exerted by shareholders 
in non-default states and by creditors in default states. In the event of the borrower’s default, 
it is efficient to delegate the control to banks, to bundle the creditors’ claims and reduce costs 
of free-riding by bondholders (Aghion/Bolton 1992, Neuberger 2000, p.14). In non-default 
states, corporate control should be exerted by financial intermediaries that hold large blocks, 
thus bundling the interests of dispersed shareholders and preventing actions of firm managers 
against  the  interests  of  minority  shareholders  and  bondholders.  This  may  also  be  done  by 
banks  via  voting  rights  from  equity  holdings,  proxy  voting  rights  or  supervisory  board 
mandates. Equity holdings by banks reduce their incentives to pose creditor over shareholder 
interests, providing a solution to the bondholder vs. shareholder conflict (Stiglitz 1985).
20 
Thus,  relationship  banking  may  reduce  not  only  the  agency  costs  of  external  debt  by 
monitoring borrowers in long-term relationships, but also the agency costs of external equity. 
However, given the fact that a bank’s debt claims are mostly bigger than its share blocks in a 
                                                 
19Schleifer/Vishny (1997), La Porta et al. (1999) 
20For a further argument in favor of simultaneous lending and shareholding by banks see Neuberger/Neumann 
(1991).   24 
firm, it is rational for it to act primarily in the creditor interests, and the effectiveness of banks 
as actively monitoring in the shareholder interests is still an open question (Boehmer 2000). 
As shown by Chirinko and Elston (1996), one of the advantages of bank influence over firms 
is  that,  at  least  in  the  German  environment,  banks  reduce  agency  costs  associated  with 
corporate control and at the same time lower finance costs due to superior information and 
more  effective  monitoring  of  management  activity.  Anyway,  according  to  Schäfer  (2003) 
relationship  banking  and  a  bank’s  control over a firm “are just the two sides of the same 
coin”:  she  provides  examples  on  how  this  “domination”  could  affect  the  management 
incentives  and  the  banks’  incentives  to  monitor  the  managers  of  the  “supposed  to  be” 
controlled company.  
Demsetz  and  Villalonga  (2001)  argued  that  the  greater  is  the  degree  to  which  shares  are 
concentrated in the hands of outside shareholders, the more effectively management behavior 
should  be  monitored  and  disciplined.  This  seems  to  be  the  case  for  the  role  of  banks  as 
external  monitors  in  Continental  Europe.  Dherment-Ferere  et  al.  (2001)  found  a  positive 
disciplining  effect  of  qualified  banking  share  blocks,  while  Lehmann  and  Weigand  (2000) 
found  that  financial  institutions  as  largest  shareholders  of  traded  corporations  enhanced 
profitability.  Baums  (1994)  argues  that  the  presence  of  major  lenders  in  the  board  could 
represent by itself a limit of managers’ ex post moral hazard. When the stock market is (ab-
)used by managers the awareness of being monitored can reflect in an excessive myopia of the 
managers,  i.e.  in  the  willingness  of  improving  the  company’s  results  (e.g.  by  creative 
accounting, sudden appreciation of assets, manipulation of the accounting data), in order to 
show  their  capability  as  business leaders. The presence of long-term shareholders prevents 
such behavior, at least as long as they perform a real monitoring activity.  
Also in market-based financial systems with less control rights of banks, relationship banking 
lowers agency costs of external finance. Jensen (1986) argues that debt financing reduces free 
cash  flow  and  therefore  has  a  disciplinary  effect  on  management:  managers  can  use  high 
leverage  to  signal  credibly  that  they  maximize  profits.  Likewise,  any  disciplinary  impact 
creditors have on management should be the greatest when a large fraction of debt is bank 
debt. This is backed by empirical evidence: stock prices respond positively and significantly 
especially  to  announcements  of  bank  loans  (James  1987),  and  the  cost  of  issuing  public 
securities is significantly lower for firms with borrowing relationships to banks (James/Wier 
1990, Datta et al. 1999). This evidence about the uniqueness of bank loans makes clear that 
relationship banking is superior to relationship investing in reducing agency costs of external  
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finance: non-bank institutional investors may only lower  agency costs of external equity by 
active monitoring in the interest of shareholders. 
3.6 Governance of Incomplete Financial Contracts 
Transaction cost theory focuses on the ex post governance of incomplete contracts to answer 
Coase’s  question  about  the  boundaries  between  firms  and  markets.  Incompleteness  of 
contracts means that not all contingencies are contractually covered, and is the more relevant 
the longer the term of the contract. 
Relationship finance is by definition long-term finance and thus carries the feature of a firm 
described by Coase: “A firm is likely therefore to emerge in those cases where a very short 
term  contract  would  be  unsatisfactory.  It  is  obviously  of  more  importance  in  the  case  of 
service  -labor-  than  it  is  in  the  case  of  buying  commodities”  (Coase,  1937,  p.392).  This 
applies to the financial services provided by banks and non-bank institutional investors.  
The long-term nature of these services is above all inherent in relationship lending. Like long-
term labor contracts, these loan contracts may be perceived as implicit contracts, in which 
banks offer to relieve their borrowers of some market risks in return for the right to make 
allocative decisions. They result from bargaining between the bank and the borrowing firm 
over  sharing  the  returns  of  their  relation  specific  (informational)  investments.  Within  this 
frame  relationship  banking  represents  a  specific  asset  whose  value  cannot  be  independent 
from the firm itself.  
The provision of risk by an implicit long-term loan contract implies that the bank’s claims are 
no longer state-independent. One benefit of relationship lending is seen in its intertemporal 
contract  design.  The  basic  idea  is  that  the long-term binding of the borrower to the bank 
enables  the  bank  to  compensate  losses  in  some  periods  by  gains  in  other  periods.
21  This 
permits the funding of loans (relationship loans) that are not profitable for the bank from a 
short-term perspective but may be profitable if the relationship with the borrower lasts long 
enough  (Boot  2000)
22,  enabling  e.g.  long-term  investment  projects  (Ongena/Smith  2000). 
Long-term  relationships  make  possible  value-enhancing  intertemporal  transfers  in  loan 
pricing,  with  the  bank  charging  different  interest  rates  according  to  different  business 
situations of the borrower, even if in the long run the total amount of interests paid is equal to 
                                                 
21See e.g. Greenbaum et al. (1989), Petersen/Rajan (1995). For a detailed discussion of the theoretical literature 
see Elsas (2001, pp.56). 
22Boot/Thakor (2000, p. 683) provide a further definition of a relationship loan as “a loan that permits the bank 
to use its expertise to improve the borrower’s project payoff”.   26 
the  case  of  a  fix  interest  rate  contract.  Moreover  when  firms  have  financial  or  industrial 
problems  they  look  for  help  by  their  relation  bank  or  housebank.  They  know  that  their 
housebank,  having  made  costly  investments  in  order  to  build  up  a  long-term  relationship, 
would not have an advantage in letting the client go bankrupt (Macey/Miller 1995, Das/Nanda 
1999). Indeed, housebanks are more committed to their clients, providing more finance if the 
firm faces sudden and temporary difficulties (Elsas/Krahnen 1998, p. 1284). Another aspect 
of  intertemporal  contract design is given by the refinancing of the banks by standard debt 
(deposit)  contracts.  Through  long  term  commitments  to  their  borrowers,  banks  can 
compensate losses in some periods by gains in other periods, facilitating intertemporal risk 
diversification (Allen/Gale 2000): systematic risk may not be diversified at a specific point in 
time, but across generations by long-term, long living banks. 
Since an incomplete contract does not specify rules for each possible state of the world, the 
optimal  contract  should be structured to provide incentives to both parties to take mutual 
beneficial  actions.  In  relationship  lending,  this  is  done  by  the  possibility  of  renegotiations 
(Elsas  2001,  p.  19).  While  in  the  case  of  arm’s  length  debt  the  borrower  cannot  credibly 
commit to liquidate its firm in a distress situation, the power of its housebank to renegotiate 
will lead to more efficient decisions about firm liquidation or continuation (Rajan 1992). This 
can  be  interpreted  as  a  kind  of  insurance  service  provided  by  the  housebank:  the  ex  ante 
choice  of  relationship  lending  prevents  negative  value  effects  of  opportunistic  behavior  by 
one contract partner, which cannot be prevented by alternative financial arrangements (Elsas 
2001, p. 26). 
According to Chemanur and Fulghieri (1994) banks use the ability to renegotiate as a means 
to acquiring reputation. Reputation building provides the bank with the incentive to establish 
a long-term relationship with a firm.
23 In their model, banks also have the choice between 
liquidating  the  firm  when  distressed  or  renegotiating  the  loan  contract.  Banks  wishing  to 
establish  a  reputation  for  financing  productive  firms,  monitor  the  firms  more  intensively, 
which in turn leads to more efficient continuation decisions in renegotiations (Ongena/Smith 
2000).  Bester/Scheepens  (1996,  p.  571)  underline  that  the  advantages  connected  with 
establishing a debt history can in the long-run overcome the costs associated with an initial 
debt. Their result goes against the first argument of the pecking order hypothesis of Myers 
and Majluf (1984), according to which internal finance should be preferred to bank debt. They 
                                                 
23Generally, reputation is an incentive mechanism for long-term implicit contracts: “if somebody deviates from 
the terms of the contract, the deviation becomes widely known, and the deviant finds it difficult to locate 
trading partners in the future” (Azariadis 1990, p. 138).   
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consider the decision to finance an investment by bank debt rather than by internal funds. In 
taking into account the costs associated with bank debt, side by side with the advantages of 
establishing  a  positive  debt  history,  we  expect  that  if  the  bank  relationship  is  publicly 
observable,  the  reputation  for  both  the  bank  and  the  firm  improves  as  the  length  of  the 
relationship increases.
24 
On the one hand, bank relationships are credible signals since the bank places its own wealth 
at the borrower’s disposal (Collin 1997), and also its own reputation (Stiglitz 1985). On the 
other hand, the longevity of the relationship should not be informative for new entrants since 
competitors don’t know the prices and the terms associated with the relationship. Thus the 
incumbent bank may have a long relationship with a very risky borrower only because the 
bank is able to be compensated by an appropriate interest rate (Greenbaum et al. 1989).
25 
Another  incentive  for  banks  to  enter  a  lending  relationship  is  collateral  provided  by  the 
borrowing firm. Longhofer and Santos (1998) show that by increasing the seniority of the 
bank’s  debt  claims,  inside  collateral  provides  incentives  for  efficient  monitoring  in  distress 
situations,  since  in  such  states  the  most  senior  claimant  benefits  first  from  improving  the 
quality of the firm, “…and it is in such states that the true value of relationship lending comes 
to light. If banks are made junior to other creditors, they will have little incentive to build a 
relationship  that  might  allow  them  to  determine  the  value  of  such  an  investment” 
(Longhofer/Santos 1998, p. 2). If there are more than one debt claimant, it may be optimal to 
determine the structure of seniority strategically ex ante, anticipating future renegotiations in 
which conflicts between the different claimants are likely to cause net welfare losses. Such 
losses  may  be  reduced  by  allocating  ex  ante  the  strongest  bargaining  position  to  the  debt 
claimant which is expected to have the highest bargaining power ex post, by increasing his or 
her seniority (Welch 1997). Banks and especially inside banks are likely to be such claimants, 
because  they  have  comparative  advantages  vis-à-vis  bondholders  or  outside  banks  in 
organizing  distress  situations,  having  built  up  law  departments  or  special  reorganization 
capacities.  Hence,  housebanks  with  the  most  inside  information  should  obtain  the  highest 
seniority position by inside collateral (Elsas 2001, p. 191). 
                                                 
24Also  the  status  of  the  committed  part  (e.g.  an  international  bank  vs a regional one) may be a source of 
reputation (Schäfer 2003), or at least of creditworthiness (Chirinko/Elston 1996, Collin 1997, Ferri/Messori 
2000). 
25Within the frame of implicit contracts a similar result may be obtained in the labor market where the unknown 
variable is the workers’ productivity: a very low productivity can be compensated by an even lower wage. In a 
lot  of  labor  intense  industries,  cooperatives  among the workers arise, among others, due to the signaling 
problems connected with employees’ productivity (Dow 2003).   28 
The cost of collateralization may further explain while it should be more important in long-
term lending relationships. Lenders must evaluate and monitor collateral and bear the related 
administrative expenses. Given that evaluation costs and security registration fees represent 
fix costs, paid just once, the costs per unit time can be reduced by increasing the length of the 
lending relationship. At the same time collateralization imposes high costs to the borrower 
because it limits his or her freedom in using the collateral. As argued by Parlour and Rajan 
(2001), collateral can be considered as a commitment on the part of a borrower to accept only 
one contract, because usually the same collateral can be used to secure just one loan. 
These benefits of relationship banking, however, go along with costs due to two problems: the 
hold-up problem and the soft budget constraint problem. The hold-up problem results from 
the information monopoly the bank generates in the course of lending, that may allow it to 
make loans to the borrower at non-competitive terms in the future. Sharpe (1990) argues that 
bank  relationships  arise  in  competitive  loan  markets  because  a  bank,  which  has  privately 
observed customer quality, can “lock in” the customer, and charge above-cost interest rates, 
while  Greenbaum,  Kanatas  and  Venezia  (1989)  provide  a  further  explanation  when 
considering the costs borne by the firm in searching for competing bank offers. Because of 
this  “central  conflict  between  commitment  and  competition”  (Mayer  1988,  p.  1179),  the 
informational advantage of the inside bank is a “double-edged-sword” (Rajan 1992, p. 1369, 
see also Elsas 2001, p. 48).  
The soft budget constraint problem results from the potential lack of toughness of the bank in 
enforcing credit contracts that may come alongside with relationship banking proximity (Boot 
2000).  This  refers  to  the  possibility  that  a  relationship  bank  is  unable  to  commit  not  to 
refinance  unprofitable  projects  ex  post,  in  particular  when  the  borrower  faces  financial 
problems. In time of financial distress a relationship bank may extent further credit even to 
unprofitable  projects  in  the  hope  of  recovering  its  initial  loan  (Guatri/Vicari,  1994). 
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) argue that multiple banking may represent a solution, as it 
offers a way for banks not to commit to refinance unprofitable projects, or worst, gambling 
for  resurrection  projects,  while  Bolton  and  Scharfstein  (1996)  show  that  multiple  banking 
complicates  debt  renegotiations  due  to  communication  problems  and  asymmetry  of 
information among the different creditors.
26 As a consequence Carlin and Mayer (2000) argue 
that  multibank  systems  are  superior  in  imposing  tough  budget  constraints  on  inefficient 
                                                 
26Alchian (1993) argues that in every situation where we find a party that depends from a single supplier the 
input user could protect himself through a multiple suppliers agreement, even if at higher costs than a contract 
that restrains the single supplier from not performing as promised.  
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projects but the other side of the coin is, they are too myopic and fail to sustain efficient long 
term projects characterized by short term uncertainty.  
The feature of a long-term, incomplete contract applies also to relationship investing, however 
with a different contract design implying different risk-sharing and informational properties. 
Capital issued as public equity is a long-term claim with no other right but to liquidate the 
equity-financed project at any point in time. The decision to do so by selling shares is mainly 
based  on  public  information.  The  use  of  private  information  by  institutional  investors  is 
restricted  by  insider  trading  regulations,  in  particular  in  order  to  avoid  that  managers  and 
relevant  shareholders  collude  in  order  to  trade  at  the  expense  of  “uninformed”  or  “small” 
shareholders  (Maug,  2002).  Dherment-Ferere,  Köke  and  Renneboog  (2001)  underline  that 
little  corporate  monitoring  is  to  be  expected  from  institutional  investors,  because,  due  to 
insider  trading  regulation  non  public  corporate  information  may  temporarily  reduce  the 
liquidity of an institution’s investments. 
In contrast to relationship banking, relationship investing on the capital markets does not go 
along with implicit contracts. The state-dependent claims to the residual are explicitly defined 
by the equity contract. Institutional investors bear equity risk (and as bondholders also debt 
risk)  without  providing  insurance  services  by  intertemporal  smoothing  or  renegotiability. 
However, by gathering information and exercising direct control over the management, they 
reduce moral hazard risk to the benefit of individual shareholders or fund holders, providing 
insurance  against  this  risk  in  non-distress  states.  The incentive for relationship investing is 
likely to be long-run profit maximization rather than reputation. Since the building up of a 
close  relationship  with  a  firm  involves costs, institutional investors should only make such 
relationship-specific investments if they are compensated for these costs by higher returns in 
the future, given by a higher shareholder value and lower losses from liquidating unprofitable 
investments.  Reputation  as  an  incentive  mechanism  may  be  only  important  in  an  implicit 
contract,  if  the  time  horizon  is  fairly  long  or  the  future  is  fairly  important  relative  to  the 
present (Azariadis 1990, p. 138). Even if we consider the insurance against moral hazard risk 
provided  by  relationship  investing  as  an  implicit  contract,  the  right  to  liquidate  the  equity 
investment at any time is likely to shorten the time horizon relative to that of a long-term 
lender. Of course, this argumentation does not apply to venture capitalists or other investors in 
long-term, private equity. 
To the extent that relationship investing involves a binding of an institutional investor to a 
firm,  the  hold-up  problem  and  the  soft  budget  constraint  problem  arise  here,  too.  Such  a   30 
binding may be caused by the holding of large blocks. Traditionally one way for unsatisfied 
shareholders of an underperforming firm is to sell out the shares. The fact is that often the 
holdings  are  so  large  that  the  shares  cannot  be  sold  without  driving  the  price  down  and 
suffering  further  losses,  so  they  are  less  marketable  (Chung/Firth/Kim  2002).  As  a 
consequence institutional investors face a trade off between keeping underperforming shares 
and suffering a long-term (comparative) loss or selling out the shares and suffering a sudden 
loss.  If  they  keep  the  shares,  they  find  themselves  in  a  hold-up  situation  and  the  firm 
managers  may  exploit  their  lock-in  by  opportunistic  behavior.  Proponents  of  institutional 
investors’ activism argue that as a consequence such activity focuses on the long term and in 
doing  so  it  helps  management  to  improve  long-term  performance.  As  in  the  case  of 
relationship  banking,  the  binding  is  a  “double-edged-sword”.  The  soft  budget  constraint 
problem  may  arise  from  a  potential  lack  of  toughness  of  the  relationship  investor  in 
controlling  managers  on  behalf  of  shareholders.  Opponents  of  the  institutional  investors’ 
activism maintain that the activism detracts from the primary duties of asset management’s 
managers, which is managing money for investors or other beneficiaries (Gillan/Starks 2000). 
Jarrow and Leach (1991) note that fiduciaries are confronted with conflicting interests and 
must  determine  whether  to  maximize  their  own  wealth  or    that  of  the  beneficiaries 
(Jarrow/Leach 1991): some authors note that institutions, who maintain business relationships 
with firms, may be biased in favor of management in matters pertaining to control
27. 
On  the  other  hand,  an  open  question  is  still  if  relevant  institutional  investors  have  the 
incentives to build up relevant shareblocks and thereafter to exercise an effective monitoring 
activity  on  the  company.  Admati,  Pfleiderer  and  Zechner  (1994)  demonstrate  that  in 
equilibrium the monitoring activity is below the optimal level. The fact is that every investor, 
no  matter  if  it  is  institutional  or  private,  faces  a  trade-off  between  the  benefits  of 
diversification  and  the  benefits  associated  with  monitoring  a  firm.  On  the  contrary  a 
shareholder  which  does  not  hold  any  relevant  blocks  cannot  be  considered  as  a  suitable 
monitor, given the well know contrast between the private costs of monitoring and the public 
good feature of monitoring benefits. Maug (1998, p. 89) demonstrates that the probability of 
monitoring increases in the liquidity of the market, since the liquidity of markets allows also 
large investors to benefit from monitoring, and helps to overcome the free-rider problem. 
                                                 
27Coffee (1991). A very good example is provided by Berglöf and Sjögren (1998) which presented a model with 
a bank proving loans to a borrower while an investment company, controlled by the bank, holds a relevant 
block in the borrower company. Baums (1996) and Baums and König (1997) find a high correlation between 
the underwriting and investment policy of bank controlled investment companies (Publikumsfunds) and the 
role of the bank as coordinator of the IPO.   
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4. Conclusion 
The  shift  from  bank  intermediation  to  intermediation  by  non-bank  institutional  investors 
which  we  observe  in  continental  Europe  has  invoked  concern  about  the  dissolution  of 
valuable  long-term  bank-firm  relationships  and  their  replacement  by  arm’s  length  finance. 
However, non-bank institutional investors are also actively engaged in the firms they finance, 
providing a kind of relationship finance. The present paper reviewed the literature on both 
kinds of relationship finance to examine their relative merits. Within the theory of the firm, 
we made a comparison along the following criteria: 
- provision of the input factors risk and information  
- provision of delegated monitoring by intermediation  
- enhancement of productivity by team production  
- reduction of agency costs by corporate control 
- governance of long-term, incomplete contracts. 
We  found  that  while  relationship  banking  and  relationship  investing  are  both  superior  to 
transaction finance in providing these services, none of them is superior to the other in all 
respects. They tend to be complements rather than substitutes, their relative merits depending 
both on the type of the intermediary and the type of the firm to be financed. The comparative 
advantage  of  relationship  investing  by  venture  capital  firms  lies  in  the  provision  of  equity 
(bearing of residual-claim risk) to innovative, start-up firms, whereas relationship banking has 
its  comparative  advantage  in  the  debt  financing  (bearing  of  insolvency  risk)  of 
informationally opaque small and medium-sized firms in more mature markets or traditional 
industries.  For  these  firms,  relationship  banking  delivers  unique  monitoring  and  insurance 
services by  implicit contracts. 
Large companies, on the other hand, may profit from relationship finance by both banks and 
non-bank institutional investors (insurance firms, pension funds, mutual funds), if these hold 
large blocks of their publicly traded shares to exercise corporate control. Here, however, non-
bank  intermediaries  seem  to  be an imperfect substitute for banks: First, their incentives to 
actively invest in long-term relationships are lower because of a conflict between the use of 
inside information and the liquidity of their investments. Secondly, their disciplinary effect on 
management tends to be lower than that of banks. Third, since they do not provide liquidity, 
they  are  less  disciplined  by  their  depositors  to provide efficient delegated monitoring. The   32 
costs of delegation to non-bank institutional investors are comparatively high, because they 
have more scope to pursue their own goals apart from those of their funds’ beneficial owners.  
Finally,  the  pros  and  cons  of  the  different  forms  of  relationship  finance  depend  on  the 
liquidity of the respective financial market and on the regulatory environment. The present 
paper just developed a theoretical framework for more comparative research in this regard. 
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